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Abstract
In this paper, I consider a specific channel through which trust between parties to an
exchange can go on to affect nations’ comparative advantage in certain industries.
My approach revolves around the autonomy that employers (principals) grant to
workers (agents), which is a key feature of workplace organization. I hypothesize
that social trust generates a comparative advantage in industries with more autono-
mous micro production environments. I employ individual-level data on work auton-
omy to construct a measure of the extent to which industries are characterized by
autonomy in the production process. Results of a cross-country cross-industry ana-
lysis confirm that countries with higher levels of social trust have a comparative
advantage in high-autonomy industries and vice versa. Results are robust to the
possibility of reverse causality. The paper’s key contribution is to provide a link be-
tween the microeconomic literature on workplace organization and the comparative
macroeconomic literature on social trust.
JEL classifications: D23, L23, M54, O43, O57, P50.
1. Introduction
Social trust, which can be defined simply as a societal norm of cooperation, provides the
basis for collective action and is linked to uncertainty reduction and lower transaction costs
in economic exchange (Arrow, 1972; Gambetta, 1988; Fukuyama, 1995). As an informal
enforcement mechanism, social trust allows exchange relationships to exist and extend be-
yond kinship-based communities, in turn sustaining a more fine-grained division of labour
and increased specialization (Fukuyama, 1995). The macro-level implications of social
trust—promoting economic prosperity and fostering other beneficial societal outcomes—
are thus well understood (Beugelsdijk et al., 2004; Algan and Cahuc, 2010). Moreover, the
basic logic underlying these positive effects of social trust—running through enforcement,
transaction costs, and the division of labour—is also clear.
However, extant research has narrowly focused on relationships between macro-level
variables and does not consider how exactly trust between two or more parties to an ex-
change goes on to affect economies in the aggregate. Whilst lower transaction costs and
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uncertainty reduction are intuitively appealing promoters of economic exchange at the
micro level, little attention has been paid to the connection between the micro level at
which social trust operates and trust’s effect on economic outcomes at the macro level. This
paper seeks to contribute to the comparative macroeconomic literature on social trust by
considering such a connection. Specifically, this paper works on developing and testing a
micro-level channel through which social trust affects nations’ comparative advantage. To
do so, I combine two important developing research areas, one at the micro level and one
at the macro level.
First, a growing literature considers workplace organization or organizational design to
account for firm-level differences in performance and productivity (see Bloom et al., 2014
for a review). I expand on earlier work to consider work autonomy instead of more narrow
and concrete human resource management practices.1 Second, researchers have started to
use cross-country cross-industry analysis to study domestic institutions as determinants of
comparative advantage, especially of industry export flows (see Nunn and Trefler, 2013
and Ciccone and Papaioannou, 2016, for reviews). The idea in this literature is that the in-
stitutions in a country can be an endowment in much the same way that traditional produc-
tion factors such as labour and capital are. In particular, the relative strength or weakness
of certain institutions in a country would lead this country to have a comparative advantage
in certain types of activities or industries. Earlier cross-country cross-industry studies of
countries’ comparative advantage focused on the role of formal institutions. Manova
(2008, 2013), for instance, finds that countries with a well-developed financial system have
a comparative advantage in capital-intensive industries. I follow-up with a cross-country
cross-industry analysis that considers social trust as a key informal institutional
endowment.2
Following the standard approach in the literature (Romalis, 2004; Nunn and Trefler,
2013), an essential feature of my cross-country cross-industry analysis is the benchmarking
of industries. Whereas capital or labour intensity are standard industry benchmarks, my
concern with social trust and workplace organization means that I characterize the organ-
ization of work in a particular industry based on the level of autonomy granted to em-
ployees in this industry. Trust operates at the micro level where it governs interactions
between economic actors. Hence, by considering the level of work autonomy that princi-
pals grant to their agents, I am able to construct an industry measure that embodies micro-
level evidence on a vital form of exchange between two parties. Many papers in the litera-
ture on domestic institutions and export patterns construct industry benchmarks based on
1 My focus on work autonomy matches most closely to Bloom et al.’s (2012) firm-level analysis relat-
ing trust to decentralization in multinational firms. More generally, several studies show that social
trust has a positive effect on the level of autonomy granted to employees (Van Hoorn, 2013; Gur
and Bjørnskov, 2016). Figure A.1 in the Appendix documents this positive correlation between so-
cial trust and average work autonomy in a country, using data from two of the main data sets used
in this paper.
2 Tabellini (2008) and Cingano and Pinotti (2012) examine the effect of social trust on export flows
from different types of industries. Compared to my work, these studies suffer several drawbacks,
however. These drawbacks include biased results on the count of so-called attenuation and ampli-
fication effects (Nunn and Trefler, 2013; Ciccone and Papaioannou, 2016) and the use of blunt in-
strumental variables (Bazzi and Clemens, 2013) that violate the exclusion restriction (see for
example Algan and Cahuc, [2013] for a discussion of violations of the exclusion restriction in social
trust studies).
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industries’ intermediate inputs such as capital. This paper, in contrast, employs individual-
level data, thus obtaining an industry benchmark that gives a most detailed and direct re-
flection of what goes on in firms within specific industries and how people in an industry
work together to create added value. Empirically, the key question that I address in this
paper is how social trust interacts with my industry benchmark and affects whether coun-
tries have a comparative advantage in high- or low-autonomy industries.
Workplace organization, specifically work autonomy, provides the starting point for my
analysis. A straightforward definition of work autonomy is as ‘the condition or quality of
being self-governing or free from excessive external control’ (Jermier and Michaels, 2001,
p.1006). I have the following hypothesis: the stronger a country’s social trust norm, the
more this country has a comparative advantage in industries characterized by high levels of
work autonomy in their production processes. Autonomy for workers is associated with
various advantages for firms, deriving from the division of labour and specialization in the
production process (Becker and Murphy, 1992). Granting specialist workers the autonomy
to organize their productive activities in the way they deem fit results in a more efficient
production process than when a non-specialist manager tells workers exactly what they
should be doing. However, a disadvantage of giving employees freedom to perform their
job in their own way is that, in the absence of monitoring and control, it can be difficult to
get employees to act in the best interest of the firm, as highlighted by the classic principal–
agent problem. In short, for firms, work autonomy only pays off if this autonomy is accom-
panied by a certain amount of trust. The reason is that the presence of trust implies that the
principal is justified in relying on the agent to foster the principal’s interests despite a lack
of formal incentives. In contrast, if trust is absent, costs due to shirking are likely to out-
weigh the benefits of having expert workers that can leverage tacit skills and uncodified
knowledge. The effect of social trust that matters here is therefore not so much about beliefs
that employers have about their workers, but about how workers will behave when granted
a certain amount of autonomy. Aggregating the above logic of trust as a form of cooper-
ation, I expect that industries characterized by highly autonomous work environments will
flourish in high-trust societies, whilst these industries will struggle in low-trust societies.
More specifically, I expect that social trust acts as an institutional endowment so that coun-
tries with strong societal trust norms will have a comparative advantage in industries with
more autonomous work environments as for these industries social trust is a relatively more
important endowment. Overall, the theoretical rationale for my hypothesis thus follows the
standard logic of comparative advantage and relative factor abundance: countries will have
a comparative advantage in those industries for which their informal institutional endow-
ments provide a useful resource for firms active in these industries and vice versa.3
To test my hypothesis, I use the standard cross-country cross-industry estimating equa-
tion for comparative advantage (e.g. Romalis, 2004). This means that I interact my measure
of social trust with the industry benchmark of work autonomy, whilst controlling for coun-
try and industry fixed effects. A positive and significant coefficient for this interaction indi-
cates that countries with higher social trust have a comparative advantage in high-
autonomy industries, which would confirm my hypothesis. Results provide strong support
3 Of course, the proposition that high-trust countries have a comparative advantage in high-
autonomy industries (and vice versa) takes in the empirical evidence showing a positive effect of
social trust on work autonomy (e.g. Bloom et al., 2012; Van Hoorn, 2013; Gur and Bjørnskov, 2016;
see, also, Note 1 and Fig. A.1 in the Appendix).
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for my hypothesis and are robust to a variety of checks, including the use of alternative
measures of industry work autonomy. To identify whether social trust indeed causally
interacts with industry work autonomy to affect countries’ comparative advantage in spe-
cific industries, I build on Algan and Cahuc’s (2010) analysis and use trust scores from mi-
grants to measure the cultural component of social trust that is independent of countries’
economic and institutional environment. The resulting trust indicator helps affirm that so-
cial trust causally interacts with workplace organization to shape cross-country patterns of
comparative advantage. Overall, the evidence thus provides strong empirical support for
the idea that social trust interacts with workplace organization to affect economies in the
aggregate.
This paper, then, makes two main contributions, an empirical one and a broader, con-
ceptual one. Extant studies of the economics of social trust leave us wondering about a spe-
cific channel through which trust between parties to an exchange affects economies in the
aggregate. The basic logic—running through uncertainty reduction and lowering of trans-
action costs—is obvious, but lacks detailed evidence on the steps involved, particularly at
the micro level, which is the level at which we expect trust to act as an informal enforce-
ment mechanism that facilitates exchange between economic actors. My main empirical
contribution subsequently is to pin down a specific channel for a key macroeconomic con-
sequence of social trust, namely nations’ comparative advantage. Starting with workplace
organization at the micro level and going up all the way to comparative advantage at the
macro level, this paper’s empirical evidence shows how trust between two parties can go on
to affect societies as whole.
The paper’s broader contribution lies in connecting important research areas.
Institutions, formal ones such as rule of law and informal ones such as culture and social
trust, are widely recognized for having important macroeconomic consequences. Similarly,
there is increasing interest in workplace organization and organizational design as key de-
terminants of firm performance. Nevertheless, even though the development of economies
as a whole is crucially driven by the activities of firms, these two literatures have mostly de-
veloped disjointedly. My paper indicates one way of integrating the two strands of research,
forging the kind of connection between different levels of analysis that seems vital for better
understanding a variety of macroeconomic outcomes and how these are affected by infor-
mal institutions.
2. Autonomy as a feature of workplace organization
2.1 Measuring work autonomy
Management scholars have long been interested in features of workplace organization and
what workers actually experience in their jobs (e.g. Hackman and Oldham, 1975). Adam
Smith’s (1776) famous description of a pin factory is thereby identified as the first contribu-
tion on this topic (Oldham and Hackman, 2010). The typical approach to measuring work
autonomy (or other features of workplace organization) is via surveys, specifically ques-
tionnaire items that ask respondents to report on the level of autonomy or freedom that
they experience in their work. Different survey instruments are available and the most
widely used instruments simply ask respondents something along the following lines:
‘Using this card, please say how much the management at your work allows/allowed you to
decide how your own daily work is organised.’ This item is included in the European Social
Survey (ESS) (Jowell and the Central Co-ordinating Team, 2007), a cross-national survey
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of some 30 Eurasian countries, and the main item that I draw on in this paper. Respondents
can rate their level of work autonomy from 0, ‘I have/had no influence’, to 10, ‘I have/had
complete control’. Of course, many different item wordings are possible. The US General
Social Survey (GSS) (Smith et al., 2013), for instance, presents a statement to respondents
(‘I am given a lot of freedom to decide how to do my own work’) and offers four possible
answers (‘1—Not at all true’, ‘2—Not too true’, ‘3—Somewhat true’, and ‘4—Very true’).4
The basic idea is always the same, however, namely that people report on their experienced
level of work autonomy.
2.2 Validity of measured work autonomy
A concern with the typical work autonomy measure is that it is subjective, based on individ-
uals’ perceptions, which could result in biases due to non-random measurement error. Of
course, work autonomy has already been much studied in management (see Jermier and
Michaels, 2001, for a review). Nevertheless, to gather some explicit evidence on the validity
of measured work autonomy, I adopt the standard approach to assessing construct validity
in psychology, which is to check how a measured construct relates to other constructs that
would theoretically relate to the construct of interest in specific ways (Cronbach and
Meehl, 1955). If a construct is valid, it should exhibit logical relationships with other
constructs.
Taking this approach, I find that measured work autonomy relates to a variety of other
factors in a manner that provides strong validation of the construct (Table 1). Notably,
managers have higher levels of work autonomy than subordinates do and the higher edu-
cated are granted more autonomy than people with lower levels of education are. In add-
ition, levels of work autonomy relate to other perceived features of workplace
organization, specifically the amount of influence people have on organizational decisions
(see Van Hoorn, 2016). Overall, patterns found are precisely the patterns that we expect
from valid measures of work autonomy, strongly suggesting that indicators of work auton-
omy indeed measure what they are supposed to measure.
3. A measure of industry work autonomy
In this section, I construct a measure of industry work autonomy and demonstrate the reli-
ability of this measure. Valid measures of work autonomy offer a great opportunity to
benchmark industries on the basis of the micro-level features of their work environments,
in turn allowing me to establish a micro-level channel for the effect of social trust on macro-
economic outcomes.
My approach is to employ individual-level data on work autonomy and construct an in-
dustry benchmark that captures how people in specific industries work together to create
value added. By nature of their production processes and how these are organized, indus-
tries may be characterized as having more or less autonomous work environments. Taking
this micro-level approach, I ensure that my analysis of countries’ comparative advantage in
specific industries is consistent with and, in fact, strongly grounded in our understanding of
trust as a factor shaping exchange relationships between economic actors.
4 For this last example, I have reverse coded the original answer categories of the item to let higher
scores indicate higher levels of work autonomy.
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Table 1. Validity of the work autonomy measure
Panel A: General Social Survey (GSS) data
Variable Mean work
autonomy (1-4)
Manager
Yes [n¼ 418] 3.53 (0.736)
No [n¼ 743] 3.31 (0.856)
Highest educational degree
Less than high school [n¼ 405] 3.35 (0.859)
High school [n¼ 2346] 3.33 (0.864)
Associate/Junior college [n¼442] 3.43 (0.789)
Bachelor’s [n¼933] 3.44 (0.751)
Graduate [n¼ 512] 3.61 (0.641)
In your job, how often do you take part with others in
making decisions that affect you?
Often [n¼1907] 3.58 (0.658)
Sometimes [n¼1663] 3.35 (0.794)
Rarely [n¼669] 3.14 (0.950)
Never [n¼396] 3.09 (1.08)
How often do you participate with others in helping set
the way things are done on your job?
Often [n¼1554] 3.58 (0.685)
Sometimes [n¼1181] 3.34 (0.784)
Rarely [n¼461] 3.12 (0.909)
Never [n¼277] 3.00 (1.11)
Panel B: International Social Survey Program (ISSP) data
Variable Mean work
autonomy (1-3)
Manager
Yes [n¼ 7461] 2.20 (0.679)
No [n¼ 15,652] 1.88 (0.742)
Education level
No formal qualification [n¼ 2268] 1.84 (0.820)
Lowest formal qualification [n¼ 2763] 1.95 (0.807)
Above lowest qualification [n¼4284] 1.96 (0.753)
Higher secondary completed [n¼ 5315] 1.97 (0.729)
Above higher secondary level [n¼4743] 2.05 (0.705)
University degree completed [n¼ 4879] 2.15 (0.672)
Applies to respondent’s job: I can work independently
Strongly agree [n¼6302] 2.33 (0.694)
Agree [n¼11,088] 2.08 (0.697)
Neither agree nor disagree [n¼ 2937] 1.71 (0.657)
Disagree [n¼ 2854] 1.53 (0.666)
Strongly disagree [n¼ 1080] 1.46 (0.657)
Panel C: European Social Survey (ESS) data
Variable Mean work
autonomy (0-10)
Manager
Yes [n¼ 42,319] 7.72 (2.58)
No [n¼ 101,836] 5.18 (3.64)
(continued)
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Table 1. Continued
Panel C: European Social Survey (ESS) data
Variable Mean work
autonomy (0-10)
Education (ES-ISCED)
I, less than lower secondary [n¼6849] 4.50 (3.88)
II, lower secondary [n¼ 14,226] 4.65 (3.80)
IIIb, upper secondary, vocational or no access to V1 [n¼ 22,478] 5.33 (3.65)
IIIa, upper secondary, general and/or access to V1 [n¼17,599] 5.77 (3.48)
IV, advanced vocational, sub-degree [n¼8496] 6.52 (3.31)
V1, lower tertiary education, BA level [n¼9106] 7.34 (2.68)
V2, higher tertiary education,>¼MA level [n¼9325] 7.42 (2.69)
Current job: can decide time start/finish work
Not at all true [n¼9692] 4.96 (3.50)
A little true [n¼3690] 6.33 (2.93)
Quite true [n¼2852] 7.41 (2.50)
Very true [n¼2395] 8.20 (2.45)
Years of schooling (seven quantiles)
Quantile 1 (4.82 years of schooling on average) [n¼ 14,161] 4.88 (3.87)
Quantile 2 (8.51 years of schooling on average) [n¼ 17,334] 4.94 (3.81)
Quantile 3 (10.6 years of schooling on average) [n¼ 25,500] 5.31 (3.69)
Quantile 4 (12.0 years of schooling on average) [n¼ 22,967] 5.66 (3.56)
Quantile 5 (13.0 years of schooling on average) [n¼ 13,780] 6.06 (3.39)
Quantile 6 (14.9 years of schooling on average) [n¼ 29,562] 6.73 (3.14)
Quantile 7 (18.7 years of schooling on average) [n¼ 20,411] 7.36 (2.73)
Allowed to influence policy decisions about activities of organization (01–0)
0 I have/had no influence [n¼38,206] 3.15 (3.65)
1 [n¼ 10,697] 4.18 (3.16)
2 [n¼ 8947] 5.28 (2.82)
3 [n¼ 7264] 5.86 (2.55)
4 [n¼ 5490] 6.15 (2.35)
5 [n¼ 11,206] 6.74 (2.26)
6 [n¼ 6869] 7.31 (1.86)
7 [n¼ 8417] 7.83 (1.70)
8 [n¼ 8695] 8.36 (1.51)
9 [n¼ 4740] 8.88 (1.34)
10 I have/had complete control [n¼14,539] 9.80 (0.993)
Notes: Number of observations in square brackets and standard deviations in parentheses, if applicable.
Source: Data come from the GSS (years 2002, 2006, and 2010), the 2005 International Social Survey Program
(ISSP) Module on Work Orientation (ISSP Research Group, 2013), and the ESS (Waves 1–4) (Jowell and the
Central Co-ordinating Team, 2007). The ISSP measure of work autonomy asks respondents ‘Which of the fol-
lowing statements best describes how your daily work is organized?’, giving three possible answers: ‘1—I am
not free to decide how my daily work is organized’, ‘2—I can decide how my daily work is organized, within
certain limits’, and ‘3—I am free to decide how my daily work is organized’. As with the GSS item, I have re-
verse coded answer categories for this item so that a higher score indicates more work independence. ISCED
stands for International Standard Classification of Education. The division of respondents’ number of years of
schooling in seven quantiles (ESS data) has been chosen to match the seven categories of ISCED. Waves from
the ESS are selected to match the ESS waves that I use later to benchmark industries by their level of work au-
tonomy. Instead of calculating mean autonomy scores, I have also estimated regression models with work au-
tonomy as the dependent variable and the individual characteristics listed in the table as independent variables,
as in Van Hoorn (2013). Results (available on request) reveal the same patterns as presented here, supporting
the construct validity of the work autonomy measure. More information about the surveys used, as well as de-
tails on all questionnaire items, can be found at the websites of these surveys: http://www.europeansocialsur
vey.org for the ESS, http://gss.norc.org for the GSS, and http://www.issp.org for the ISSP.
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I measure industry work autonomy using the first four waves of the cross-national ESS
data set introduced in the previous section. The first four waves of the ESS have recorded
respondents’ industry of occupation using two-digit NACE codes (revision 1.1), for a total
of 138,445 individual observations in 62 industries.5 An important feature of my industry
work autonomy measure is that it comprises individual-level data from multiple countries
and not just one country, as is typical in the literature. A problem for cross-country cross-
industry studies is so-called benchmarking bias, which can shift estimates downwards or
upwards (Nunn and Trefler, 2013; Ciccone and Papaioannou, 2016). A downward, attenu-
ating bias occurs because the benchmarking of industries is subject to random measurement
error. The upward, amplifying bias occurs because the benchmarking of industries on the
basis of data from only one country (for example the US) likely results in an industry bench-
mark that is reminiscent of the specific institutions in this country that affect the country’s
industrial structure. An upward bias then occurs because the resulting industry benchmark
is more accurate for countries that are institutionally more similar to the country that pro-
vided the data used for constructing the original industry benchmark. I calculate the meas-
ure of industry work autonomy using data from 30 highly institutionally diverse countries,
which likely alleviates the problem of benchmarking bias.6 Nevertheless, as a robustness
check, I repeat my baseline analysis using two alternatives to my main measure of industry
work autonomy. For the first alternative measure, I use only individual-level data from
countries that have mean levels of work autonomy below the average of the 30 countries in
the ESS sample. For the second alternative measure, I use only individual-level data from
countries that have mean levels of work autonomy above the average of the 30 countries in
the ESS sample. Dividing the individual-level work autonomy data this way ensures that I
have two samples comprising roughly the same number of individuals when calculating the
alternative measures of industry work autonomy. At the end of this section, I also check the
reliability of my industry work autonomy measure, which relates to the issue of random
measurement error in industry benchmarks. Meanwhile, the two alternative measures of in-
dustry work autonomy correlate strongly with my main measure of industry work auton-
omy (r ¼ 0.907 for the ‘below-average’ measure and r ¼ 0.895 for the ‘above-average’
measure [n¼ 21]).
I calculate industry work autonomy as the mean level of work autonomy reported by all
respondents working in a particular industry. Table 2 (Panel A) presents the results for the
24 industries for which I also have country data on comparative advantage (see the next
section). Although the 24 industries are somewhat similar—none belong to the services sec-
tor—there is substantial variation in average work autonomy. Measured industry differ-
ences thereby have face validity with, for instance, the manufacture of medical, precision
and optical instruments, watches and clocks involving much more autonomy in the produc-
tion process than the manufacture of textiles. Furthermore, measured differences between
5 NACE codes refer to the Statistical Classification of Economic Activities developed by the statis-
tical agency of the European Union. NACE codes match ISIC codes. I use data from the first four
waves of the ESS only because the industry data from later waves of the ESS are not compatible
with industry data from these earlier waves.
6 In terms of institutional diversity, these countries cover all five legal origins recognized in the litera-
ture (common law, French law, German law, socialist law, and Scandinavian law) and seven out of
the 12 clusters of national culture identified by Hofstede (2001), the world’s leading cross-cultural
researcher (see Van Hoorn, 2016).
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Table 2. Autonomy as a feature of industries’ micro work environment
Panel A: Industries included in empirical analysis
Industry (NACE classification rev. 1.1, two digits, with code in square
brackets)
Industry work
autonomy benchmark
Agriculture, hunting, related service activities [1] 5.88
Forestry, logging, related service activities [2] 5.61
Fishing, fish farming and related service activities [5] 6.03
Manufacture of food products and beverages [15] 4.74
Manufacture of tobacco products [16] 4.20
Manufacture of textiles [17] 3.83
Manufacture of wearing apparel; dressing and dyeing of fur [18] 3.97
Tanning and dressing of leather [19] 4.08
Manufacture of wood and of products of wood and cork, except furniture;
manufacture of articles of straw and plaiting materials [20]
4.79
Manufacture of pulp, paper and paper products [21] 5.10
Publishing, printing and reproduction of recorded media [22] 6.42
Manufacture of coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel [23] 6.09
Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products [24] 5.85
Manufacture of rubber and plastic products [25] 4.71
Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products [26] 4.74
Manufacture of basic metals [27] 4.78
Manufacture of machinery and equipment not elsewhere classified [29] 5.29
Manufacture of office machinery and computers [30] 6.27
Manufacture of electrical machinery and apparatus not elsewhere classi-
fied [31]
5.12
Manufacture of radio, television and communication equipment and ap-
paratus [32]
5.63
Manufacture of medical, precision and optical instruments, watches and
clocks [33]
6.58
Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers [34] 5.08
Manufacture of other transport equipment [35] 5.83
Other business activities [74] 6.66
Mean of industry means for industries included in empirical analysis
(n¼ 24)
5.30
Panel B: Selected industries, not included in empirical analysis
Industry (NACE classification rev. 1.1, two digits, with code in square
brackets)
Industry work
autonomy benchmark
Mining of coal and lignite, extraction of peat [10] 3.91
Hotels and restaurants [55] 5.47
Education [80] 6.73
Activities auxiliary to financial intermediation [67] 7.24
Research and development, basic research [73] 7.53
Notes. Data are author’s calculations based on data from Waves 1–4 of the ESS, which have been held bi-annu-
ally in 2002, 2004, 2006, and 2008.
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the 24 industries coincide with our intuition concerning traditional sectors that have com-
paratively little potential for dynamic efficiency gains (e.g. manufacture of tobacco prod-
ucts) and sectors that are more high-tech and have comparatively much potential for
dynamic efficiency gains (e.g. manufacture of office machinery and computers). I find simi-
lar industry differences for the alternative measures of industry work autonomy (Table B.1
in the Appendix).
To provide a comparative perspective, I also present aggregated autonomy scores for
the second least autonomous industry, after the manufacture of textiles (mining of coal and
lignite, extraction of peat), and for some high-autonomy industries that also cannot be con-
sidered in the empirical analysis due to missing data (Table 2, Panel B).
Although employing cross-national data alleviates (benchmarking) biases, a remaining
question is whether the measure of industry work autonomy is reliable. A particular con-
cern is whether enough workers per industry have responded to the questionnaire item on
work autonomy to render consistent results for the measured differences in industries’
micro work environments. To check the reliability of the industry work autonomy measure,
I triangulate measures of aggregate work autonomy across three different surveys (Table 3).
These surveys have employed comparable but not identical questionnaire items to measure
work autonomy. Moreover, data have been collected in a highly diverse group of countries,
notably the US (GSS data), the Eurasian countries covered by the ESS data, and other coun-
tries from all over the world, including Japan, Mexico, Taiwan, South Africa and
Dominican Republic (ISSP Research Group data). Notwithstanding, correlations between
the various measures of aggregate work autonomy are strong, typically well above 0.70.
These high correlations between aggregated autonomy scores constructed from different
questionnaire items and data collected in countries with highly diverse institutional envir-
onments indicate that measures of industry work autonomy are, in fact, highly reliable, and
not nearly as susceptible to measurement error as one might expect. Whether we use data
from Eurasian countries, the US, or a varied set of countries worldwide, the industry differ-
ences in aggregate work autonomy that we find are highly similar, independent of the sam-
ple or the precise measure of work autonomy used. Still, reliability (as evidenced by the
correlations between the three measures) tends to improve from having more individual-
level respondents on which to base the work autonomy score of an industry (see, for ex-
ample, Panel A of Table 3 versus Panel B of Table 3). The most reliable results are obtained
when there are at least 100 respondents per industry (Panel C of Table 3). In the empirical
analysis, I therefore only include industries that meet this observational threshold. As it
turns out, all industries depicted in Panel A of Table 2 meet this threshold (the lowest num-
ber of individual-level observations for any industry is 107).
4. Estimating equation and data
4.1 Estimating equation
I test the hypothesis that social trust interacts with industry work autonomy to affect coun-
tries’ comparative advantage by estimating the following standard equation (Romalis,
2004):
lnRci ¼ b0 þ b1aiTc þ b2siHc þ b3aiHc þ ui þ Uc þ Yt þ eci: (1)
In this equation, lnRci is the natural logarithm of the revealed comparative advantage
(RCA) of country c in industry i, ai is the measure of industry work autonomy, and Tc is a
906 TRUST, ORGANIZATION, AND COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE
Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/oep/article-abstract/69/4/897/2883396/Social-trust-workplace-organization-and-the
by Radboud University user
on 11 October 2017
T
a
b
le
3
.
T
h
e
re
li
a
b
il
it
y
o
f
m
e
a
su
ri
n
g
in
d
u
st
ry
w
o
rk
a
u
to
n
o
m
y
In
te
rc
o
rr
el
a
ti
o
n
s
fo
r
d
if
fe
re
n
t
m
ea
su
re
s
o
f
o
cc
u
p
a
ti
o
n
a
l
w
o
rk
a
u
to
n
o
m
y
P
a
n
el
A
:
P
a
n
el
B
:
P
a
n
el
C
:
N
o
m
in
im
u
m
n
u
m
b
er
o
f
o
b
se
rv
a
ti
o
n
s
p
er
tw
o
-d
ig
it
o
cc
u
p
a
ti
o
n
a
l
ca
te
g
o
ry
M
in
im
u
m
2
0
o
b
se
rv
a
ti
o
n
s
p
er
tw
o
-d
ig
it
o
cc
u
p
a
ti
o
n
a
l
ca
te
g
o
ry
[n
¼
2
4
]
M
in
im
u
m
1
0
0
o
b
se
rv
a
ti
o
n
s
p
er
tw
o
-d
ig
it
o
cc
u
p
a
ti
o
n
a
l
ca
te
g
o
ry
[n
¼
1
9
]
M
ea
n
o
cc
u
p
a
ti
o
n
sc
o
re
o
n
w
o
rk
a
u
to
n
o
m
y
,
IS
S
P
M
ea
n
o
cc
u
p
a
ti
o
n
sc
o
re
o
n
w
o
rk
a
u
to
n
o
m
y
,
G
S
S
M
ea
n
o
cc
u
p
a
ti
o
n
sc
o
re
o
n
w
o
rk
a
u
to
n
o
m
y
,
IS
S
P
M
ea
n
o
cc
u
p
a
ti
o
n
sc
o
re
o
n
w
o
rk
a
u
to
n
o
m
y
,
G
S
S
M
ea
n
o
cc
u
p
a
ti
o
n
sc
o
re
o
n
w
o
rk
a
u
-
to
n
o
m
y
,
IS
S
P
M
ea
n
o
cc
u
p
a
ti
o
n
sc
o
re
o
n
w
o
rk
a
u
to
n
o
m
y
,
G
S
S
M
ea
n
o
cc
u
p
a
ti
o
n
sc
o
re
o
n
w
o
rk
a
u
to
n
o
m
y
,
E
S
S
0
.7
7
3
0
.5
9
8
0
.8
7
5
0
.6
3
4
0
.9
2
1
0
.8
1
1
[n
¼
3
6
]
[n
¼
2
7
]
M
ea
n
o
cc
u
p
a
ti
o
n
sc
o
re
o
n
w
o
rk
a
u
to
n
o
m
y
,
IS
S
P
1
0
.7
0
2
1
0
.7
4
1
1
0
.8
4
9
[n
¼
2
7
]
N
o
te
s:
N
u
m
b
er
o
f
in
d
u
st
ri
es
/o
b
se
rv
a
ti
o
n
s
in
sq
u
a
re
b
ra
ck
et
s,
if
a
p
p
li
ca
b
le
.
S
in
ce
d
a
ta
o
n
re
sp
o
n
d
en
ts
’
in
d
u
st
ry
(e
.g
.
N
A
C
E
co
d
es
)
a
re
se
ld
o
m
co
ll
ec
te
d
in
su
rv
ey
s,
I
h
a
v
e
ca
lc
u
la
te
d
w
o
rk
er
a
u
to
n
o
m
y
sc
o
re
s
fo
r
o
cc
u
p
a
ti
o
n
s
in
st
ea
d
.
I
u
se
d
d
a
ta
o
n
re
sp
o
n
d
en
ts
’
o
cc
u
p
a
ti
o
n
m
ea
su
re
d
b
y
In
te
rn
a
ti
o
n
a
l
S
ta
n
d
a
rd
C
la
ss
ifi
ca
ti
o
n
o
f
O
cc
u
p
a
ti
o
n
s
(I
S
C
O
)
co
d
es
.
I
th
er
eb
y
co
l-
la
p
se
d
fo
u
r-
d
ig
it
IS
C
O
co
d
es
in
to
tw
o
-d
ig
it
co
d
es
a
s
a
w
a
y
to
m
a
k
e
th
em
co
m
p
a
ra
b
le
to
th
e
tw
o
-d
ig
it
N
A
C
E
co
d
es
u
se
d
fo
r
T
a
b
le
2
.
So
u
rc
e:
D
a
ta
a
re
a
u
th
o
r’
s
ca
lc
u
la
ti
o
n
s
b
a
se
d
o
n
d
a
ta
fr
o
m
th
e
E
S
S
(W
a
v
es
1
–
4
),
fr
o
m
th
e
G
S
S
(y
ea
rs
2
0
0
2
,
2
0
0
6
,
a
n
d
2
0
1
0
),
a
n
d
fr
o
m
th
e
2
0
0
5
IS
S
P
M
o
d
u
le
o
n
W
o
rk
O
ri
en
ta
ti
o
n
(I
S
S
P
R
es
ea
rc
h
G
ro
u
p
,
2
0
1
3
).
T
h
e
IS
S
P
d
a
ta
h
a
v
e
b
ee
n
co
ll
ec
te
d
in
th
e
fo
ll
o
w
in
g
3
2
co
u
n
tr
y
re
g
io
n
s:
A
u
st
ra
li
a
,
W
es
t
G
er
m
a
n
y
,
E
a
st
G
er
m
a
n
y
,
th
e
U
K
,
th
e
U
S
,
H
u
n
g
a
ry
,
Ir
el
a
n
d
,
N
o
rw
a
y
,
S
w
ed
en
,
C
ze
ch
R
ep
u
b
li
c,
S
lo
v
en
ia
,
B
u
lg
a
ri
a
,
R
u
ss
ia
,
N
ew
Z
ea
la
n
d
,
C
a
n
a
d
a
,
th
e
P
h
il
ip
p
in
es
,
Is
ra
el
,
Ja
p
a
n
,
S
p
a
in
,
L
a
tv
ia
,
F
ra
n
ce
,
C
y
p
ru
s,
P
o
rt
u
g
a
l,
D
en
m
a
rk
,
S
w
it
ze
rl
a
n
d
,
F
la
n
d
er
s
(P
ro
v
in
ce
o
f
B
el
g
iu
m
),
F
in
la
n
d
,
M
ex
ic
o
,
T
a
iw
a
n
,
S
o
u
th
A
fr
ic
a
,
S
o
u
th
K
o
re
a
,
a
n
d
th
e
D
o
m
in
ic
a
n
R
ep
u
b
li
c.
A. VAN HOORN 907
Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/oep/article-abstract/69/4/897/2883396/Social-trust-workplace-organization-and-the
by Radboud University user
on 11 October 2017
country’s social trust norm. The key term in this equation is the interaction between indus-
try work autonomy and social trust (aiTc). By my hypothesis, a stronger social trust norm
interacts with workplace organization to generate a comparative advantage in high-
autonomy industries. Hence, I expect a positive coefficient for this trust interaction.
A concern with the trust interaction is that both social trust (Tc) and industry work au-
tonomy (ai) proxy for another set of industry features and country factors that also interact
to affect nations’ comparative advantage in specific industries. Notably, social trust and in-
dustry work autonomy appear closely related to human capital, not least as firms seem
more likely to grant autonomy to workers when these workers are better skilled and more
highly educated (cf. Table 1). To make sure that we are, in fact, capturing the effect of so-
cial trust interacting with work autonomy to affect comparative advantage and not any ef-
fect due to human capital and skill intensity, eq. 1 includes two more interaction terms. The
first of these interaction terms involves the high skill intensity of industries and countries’
human capital endowment (siHc). The second additional interaction term involves industry
work autonomy and again countries’ human capital endowment (aiHc). Together, these
two additional interaction terms help rule out any spurious effects that otherwise might be
captured by the trust interaction but that, in reality, derive from a country’s human capital
endowment or from an industry’s level of skill intensity.
To complete the estimating equation, eq. 1 further includes industry (ui) and country
fixed effects (Uc), which is standard. Let me thereby emphasize that, following the stand-
ard of cross-country cross-industry analysis, the estimating equation does not include ai
and Tc separately. Instead, the estimating equation includes industry (ui) and country
fixed effects (Uc), which capture possible direct effects of ai (which are not unique to
countries) and of Tc (which are not unique to industries) as well as any other potential in-
dustry or country confounders (e.g. Nunn and Trefler, 2013; Ciccone and Papaioannou,
2016).
The model depicted in eq. 1, meaning the model that includes the high skill intensity
interaction and the human capital work autonomy interaction, is the baseline model of my
empirical analysis. However, for my robustness checks, I also estimate models with other
interaction terms added. Specifically, a possible concern is that the model in eq. 1, whilst
controlling for human capital and skill intensity, still suffers an omitted variable bias. First,
not yet considered, countries’ formal institutional environment may also play a role (cf.
Levchenko, 2007; Nunn, 2007). Hence, to rule out any spurious effect that might derive
from not controlling for quality of formal institutions, I also consider a model that adds the
interaction between institutional quality of country c (Qc) and industry work autonomy (ai)
to the baseline model depicted in eq. 1.7 Second, I want to rule out that any effect found
might be due to higher social trust, somehow, favouring industries that are more dependent
on external finance (cf. Manova, 2008, 2013). Hence, I also extend eq. 1 to consider the
7 Still, it may be noted that, from a theoretical perspective, the interaction between formal institu-
tional arrangements and industry work autonomy is likely to be less important than the interaction
between trust and industry work autonomy. The reason is that the nature of the concept of work
autonomy means that, almost by definition, it does not involve any formal contract or agreement
between the principal and the agent that could be subject to enforcement through formal institu-
tions. Consistent with this observation, Van Hoorn (2013) finds that trust is more strongly related to
work autonomy than is institutional quality.
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interaction between social trust (Tc) and an industry benchmark of reliance on external fi-
nance (fi).
4.2 Data
4.2.1 Dependent variable My measure of comparative advantage is Balassa’s (1965)
well-known index of RCA. This index defines the RCA of industry i in country c as:
RCAic¼ (Xic / Xc) / (Xi / X), where Xic denotes exports of industry i in country c, Xc de-
notes total exports by country c across all industries, Xi denotes total exports of industry i
in all other countries combined (specifically all other OECD countries), and X denotes total
exports by all other countries combined. The underlying data are thereby converted to a
common currency. Data come from the OECD Database for Structural Analysis (known as
the STAN database) with conversion to a common currency using US$ GDP Purchasing
Power Parities (OECD, 2010). As the RCA data in STAN cover the years 1999–2008, I am
able to calculate industries’ average comparative advantage over multiple years, which re-
duces measurement error due to idiosyncratic shocks (for example fluctuations in oil prices
affecting Norway’s RCA or disadvantage in certain industries).
I am able to match industry autonomy scores to data on RCA for 24 industries from the
STAN database (see Table 2). To be sure, the STAN database covers more industries.
However, these are not at the two-digit NACE level, notably because they collapse RCA
scores for two or more two-digit industries into one. For example, NACE industries 13
(Mining of metal ores) and 14 (Other mining) do not have distinct RCA scores in the STAN
database only a single score covering both these industries. I therefore cannot match these
RCA data with the industry work autonomy measure constructed in Section 3, as this meas-
ure concerns only distinct two-digit industries. Implication is that the analysis below does
not consider all industries in the countries in my sample. Note, though, that this lack of in-
dustry data does not affect the RCA measure itself, which is still constructed involving the
exports of all countries in all industries. As data on Luxembourg are missing, the STAN
database has data available for 29 countries, all OECD members. The empirical analyses
thus concern a total of 24  29 ¼ 696 observations. Table B.1 in the Appendix presents de-
scriptive statistics for the industries included in the analysis. Table B.2 lists the countries in
the sample.
4.2.2 Key independent variables Equation 1 has two key independent variables. The
first is the measure of industry work autonomy described in the previous section. The se-
cond is social trust. I use the measure of trust available from the European Value Study
(EVS) and World Values Survey (WVS) (EVS-WVS, 2006; WVS Association, 2009). This
canonical measure derives from the dummy-coded questionnaire item asking respondents
whether they find ‘most people can be trusted’ (score of 1) or ‘you need to be very careful in
dealing with people’ (score of 0). The EVS-WVS has collected trust data in different waves,
starting in 1981. I follow the standard procedure in the literature, which is to calculate
country trust norms by aggregating responses from the various waves, meaning that for
most countries I include responses from more than one wave. This procedure matches the
conception of social trust as a stable cultural trait of societies with deep roots (Guiso et al.,
2008). Table C.1 in the Appendix presents scores on the trust measure for the 29 countries
in the sample. To address potential reverse causality, from comparative advantage to social
trust, I also construct an alternative trust indicator that provides a more direct measure of
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the cultural component of social trust and is untainted by nations’ RCA. I describe the con-
struction of this indicator and its rationale in detail in the next section.
4.2.3 Other main independent variables Equation 1 contains two other important inde-
pendent variables, one at the country level and one at the industry level. At the country
level, I measure human capital endowment using data on average years of schooling from
the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) statistical database (2014). This
database provides a measure of countries’ average years of schooling, typically at five-year
intervals. To match the period for calculating average RCA, I use data for the year 2005.
At the industry level, I measure the intensity with which an industry uses high-skilled la-
bour in the same way as I measure industry work autonomy. This means that I aggregate
individual-level data from the ESS. I again draw on the first four waves of the ESS, and con-
struct an individual-level dummy variable that gets a score of 1 if the respondent has had at
least some tertiary education (ISCED classification V1 or higher; see Panel C of Table 1)
and 0 otherwise. Aggregating this dummy variable at the industry level renders percentage
scores denoting each industry’s level of high skill intensity. Percentage scores can range
from 2.97% (agriculture, hunting, related service activities) to 20.9% (manufacture of of-
fice machinery and computers). Following the same procedure as just outlined, I also con-
struct an alternative measures of industries’ skill intensity that refers to average years of
education. I use this alternative measure to assess the robustness of my baseline results.
Table B.1 presents details including the full set of industry scores.
Finally, as indicated, my robustness checks also involve additional independent vari-
ables, specifically institutional quality at the country level and reliance on external finance
at the industry level. To measure the quality of formal institutions in a country, I use the
rule of law index from the World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators project (World
Bank, 2015). As for human capital, I use data for the year 2005. To measure an industry’s
reliance on external finance, I use data from the 2012/2013 round of the EBRD-World
Bank Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS V). This survey
asks firms in a set of emerging economies whether they have a ‘line of credit or a loan from
a financial institution?’ I subsequently calculate the industry benchmark by looking at the
percentage of firms in a two-digit industry that responded yes to this question.
5. Empirical results
5.1 Baseline results
Table 4 presents the baseline results, obtained by estimating different specifications of eq.
1. Results reveal a strong and statistically highly significantly positive interaction between
social trust and workplace organization (Model 1), which confirms my hypothesis that soci-
eties with stronger trust norms have a comparative advantage in industries characterized by
more autonomous work environments, and vice versa. This relationship between social
trust, workplace organization, and industry comparative advantage remains when control-
ling for confounding effects associated with countries’ human capital endowment and the
intensity with which industries use high-skilled labour in their production processes
(Models 2–4). The coefficients for the interaction terms involving human capital both have
the expected sign and are statistically significant at usual levels when included separately
(Models 2–3). Including both interaction terms simultaneously, however, neither of the
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terms is statistically significant at usual levels, whilst the social trust interaction is
(Model 4).
More important than statistical significance, the social trust interaction is also highly
significant in terms of effect size. As I report standardized beta coefficients, we can easily
ascertain that a one standard deviation increase in the trust interaction is associated with an
increase in RCA of about one standard deviation, ceteris paribus. Naturally, the magnitude
of the coefficient for the trust interaction decreases a bit when adding control variables.
This is as expected, however, given that social trust is recognized to have a positive effect
on human capital accumulation (Coleman, 1988). In fact, there is a case to be made that
Models 2–4 are overfitted because social trust has a causal effect on human capital. In terms
of the aim of this paper, these baseline results provide strong support for the idea that
industries characterized by highly autonomous micro work environments flourish in high-
trust societies, in turn resulting in predictable patterns of comparative advantage at the
macro level.
5.2 Robustness checks
To assess the robustness of the baseline results presented in Table 4, I perform several add-
itional checks. I start with a very simple and general check that explicitly deals with out-
liers. For this purpose, I re-estimate eq. 1 (Model 4 in Table 4) using quantile regressions
and a sample that excludes any observations that score more than two standard deviations
below or above the mean on either RCA (lnRci) or on the trust interaction (aiTc). I do not
report detailed results here, but these are available on request. In all cases, the coefficient
for the interaction between social trust and industry work autonomy remains strongly posi-
tive and highly statistically significant.
As indicated in the previous section, to address potential benchmarking biases (Nunn
and Trefler, 2013; Ciccone and Papaioannou, 2016), I check the robustness of my baseline
results to the measure of industry work autonomy used. Results show that the relationship
between the trust interaction and comparative advantage continues to hold when using the
Table 4. Work autonomy, social trust, and revealed comparative advantage
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Social trust interaction (aiTc) 1.32*** 1.12*** 0.984*** 0.984***
(0.205) (0.227) (0.240) (0.240)
High skill intensity interaction (siHc) - 0.453* - 0.205
(0.231) (0.361)
Human capital work autonomy interaction (aiHc) - - 0.770** 0.566
(0.311) (0.494)
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of obs. 696 696 696 696
R2 0.276 0.279 0.280 0.281
Notes: The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of revealed comparative advantage of country c in in-
dustry i (see eq. 1). Sample covers 24 industries (two-digit NACE) in 29 countries. Standard errors (in paren-
theses) are robust standard errors. Coefficients are standardized beta coefficients. ***p< 0.01, **p< 0.05, and
*p< 0.10.
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Table 5. Robustness check for alternative measures of industry work autonomy, an alternative
measure of industry skill intensity, and different samples
Alternative industry
work autonomy
measure, below-average
work autonomy sample
Alternative industry
work autonomy measure,
above-average work
autonomy sample
Alternative
measure of
high skill
intensity (si)
(5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Social trust interaction with
industry autonomy meas-
ure based on below-aver-
age work autonomy
sample (aiTc)
0.830*** - - - -
(0.290)
Social trust interaction with
industry autonomy meas-
ure based on above-aver-
age work autonomy
sample (aiTc)
- - 0.770** - -
(0.305)
Social trust interaction (aiTc) - 1.04*** - 0.738*** 0.984***
(0.260) (0.225) (0.240)
High skill intensity inter-
action (siHc)
0.499 0.031 0.585* 0.084 -
(0.315) (0.386) (0.333) (0.460)
General skill intensity inter-
action (siHc)
- - - - 0.487
(0.507)
Human capital autonomy
interaction with industry
autonomy measure based
on below-average work au-
tonomy sample (aiHc)
0.230 - - - -
(0.448)
Human capital autonomy
interaction with industry
autonomy measure based
on above-average work au-
tonomy sample (aiHc)
- - 0.901* - -
(0.518)
Human capital autonomy
interaction (aiHc)
- 0.875 - 1.21** 0.466
(0.543) (0.592) (0.459)
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of obs. 609 609 609 609 696
No. of countries 29 29 29 29 29
No. of industries 21 21 21 21 24
R2 0.2563 0.2707 0.3347 0.3359 0.2816
Notes: The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of revealed comparative advantage of country c in in-
dustry i. The industries that have been dropped differ for the two alternative measures of industry work auton-
omy (see Table B.2 in Appendix B). Standard errors (in parentheses) are robust standard errors. Coefficients
are standardized beta coefficients. ***p< 0.01, **p< 0.05, and *p< 0.10.
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two alternative measures of industry work autonomy (Models 5 and 7 in Table 5).
Estimates are less precise, but this is as expected given that the two alternative measures are
based on less information (i.e. on fewer individual-level observations) than the original
measure of industry work autonomy and, therefore, have more measurement error. In
terms of attenuating or amplifying bias, using the two alternative measures of industry
work autonomy renders both a larger and a smaller coefficient for the trust interaction
compared to models that concern the same sample but employ my original measure of in-
dustry work autonomy (Model 5 versus Model 6 and Model 7 versus Model 8). Being in be-
tween, I conclude that the original industry work autonomy measure is able to render
estimates that are largely unbiased, neither over- nor understating the extent to which social
trust and workplace organization interact to shape cross-country patterns of comparative
advantage.
Expanding on the industry benchmarking check, I also assess whether the baseline re-
sults are robust to using the alternative measure of industry skill intensity that I have con-
structed. Again, results are largely the same as before (Model 9 in Table 5 versus Model 4
in Table 4).
Finally, I extend the baseline model to control for quality of formal institutions and
industries’ dependence on external finance respectively (Table 6). In all cases, the estimated
coefficient for the interaction between trust and industry work autonomy remains strongly
and statistically significantly positive. This finding extends to the model that considers both
institutional quality and dependence on external finance simultaneously (Model 13).
Table 6. Controlling for institutional quality and industries’ dependence on external finance
Quality of formal
institutions (Qc)
External finance
dependence (fi)
Quality of formal
institutions &
Dependence on
external finance
(10) (11) (12) (13)
Social trust interaction (aiTc) 0.946*** 1.08*** 1.02*** 1.04***
(0.299) (0.254) (0.244) (0.309)
Institutional quality interaction (aiQc) 0.053 – – 0.065
(0.373) (0.392)
Dependence on external finance
interaction (fiTc)
- 0.158 – 0.158
(0.142) (0.142)
High skill intensity interaction (siHc) 0.205 0.263 0.383 -0.263
(0.361) (0.483) (0.465) (0.484)
Human capital work autonomy
interaction (aiHc)
0.560 1.22* 1.35** 1.21*
(0.510) (0.626) (0.603) (0.642)
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of obs. 696 609 609 609
No. of countries 29 29 29 29
No. of industries 24 21 21 21
R2 0.2808 0.3372 0.3356 0.3373
Notes: The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of revealed comparative advantage of country c in in-
dustry i. Standard errors (in parentheses) are robust standard errors. Coefficients are standardized beta coeffi-
cients. ***p< 0.01, **p<0.05, and *p< 0.10.
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5.3 Dealing with potential reverse causality
Although the above results are suggestive of social trust causally interacting with work-
place organization to affect industry comparative advantage, without additional evidence
we cannot rule out completely that there is reverse causality between social trust and
countries’ comparative advantage in certain industries. Indeed, the positive relationship
between the trust interaction and RCA would also be consistent with a process in which
countries that have a comparative advantage in high-autonomy industries tend to develop
societal norms that provide further support to the workings of these industries.
Ordinarily, one would deal with this endogeneity problem via instrumental variables ana-
lysis. Instrumenting for social trust is notoriously problematic, however, as the factor(s)
that could instrument for social trust typically also instrument for other determinants of
comparative advantage, thus violating the exclusion restriction (e.g. Algan and Cahuc,
2013).
My solution is to construct an indicator of social trust that captures the stable cultural
component of trust, meaning that this indicator is as much as possible independent of eco-
nomic and institutional influences in general and of industry comparative advantage in
particular. The way I go about constructing this indicator is to use trust levels reported by
migrants to proxy for social trust in these migrants’ countries of ancestry (cf. Algan and
Cahuc, 2010). Migrants are a special group, as they can still harbour their culturally
determined trust attitudes but are not affected by the reigning economic and institutional
conditions in their ancestry countries, simply because they no longer reside in these coun-
tries. Accordingly, the remaining country-of-ancestry effects are a direct reflection of the
cultural component of social trust, whilst the only economic or institutional influences on
migrants’ trust levels are due to the economic and institutional conditions in their destin-
ation countries. The data that I use to construct this indicator of the cultural component
of social trust come from the ESS (Waves 1–5) and concern first and second generation
Table 7. The causal effect of social trust on comparative advantage in high-/low-autonomy
industries
(14) (15)
Social trust interaction (aiTc) 0.758*** 0.607**
(0.268) (0.268)
High skill intensity interaction (siHc) 0.205 0.205
(0.360) (0.386)
Human capital work autonomy interaction (aiHc) 0.738 0.630
(0.527) (0.563)
Institutional quality interaction (aiQc) - 0.335
(0.293)
Country fixed effects Yes Yes
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes
No. of obs. 696 696
R2 0.2774 0.2789
Notes: The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of revealed comparative advantage of country c in in-
dustry i. Since the trust measure used for this table is itself generated using regression analysis, standard errors
are robust standard errors that are bootstrapped using 1,000 repetitions. Coefficients are standardized beta co-
efficients. ***p< 0.01, **p< 0.05, and *p< 0.10.
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migrants. The Appendix presents a detailed description of the construction of the
indicator.8
I use the alternative social trust indicator to re-estimate the baseline model (Model 4).
The trust interaction remains highly statistically significant and sizeable, also when I further
control for institutional quality (cf. Model 10) (Table 7). Overall, I conclude that social
trust indeed causally interacts with workplace organization to shape cross-country patterns
of comparative advantage.
6. Conclusion
The idea of specialization through the division of labour is one of the most powerful ideas
in economics. Trust subsequently is widely recognized for its role as a social lubricant, fos-
tering mutually beneficial exchange and thereby sustaining higher levels of specialization.
Moreover, many studies show that social trust is a robust determinant of various macroeco-
nomic outcomes. What is lacking, however, is a specific pathway that can take us from the
micro logic of trust as a promoter of economic exchange to the macro evidence on the effect
of social trust on societies as a whole. In this paper, I have sought to develop such a chan-
nel, working on pinning down how social trust may matter for the interaction between eco-
nomic actors at the micro level in a way that affects economies in the aggregate.
Specifically, my empirical analysis indicates that social trust interacts with workplace or-
ganization to determine countries’ comparative advantage and shape cross-country patterns
of comparative advantage.
The paper’s broader contribution lies in bringing together two important literatures
that so far have been largely unconnected. Significant advances have been made in the lit-
erature on the effect of workplace organization and organizational design on firm per-
formance (e.g. Bloom et al., 2014) and in the literature on the effect of informal
institutions, particularly social trust, on macroeconomic outcomes (Algan and Cahuc,
2013). Unfortunately, these developments have been happening largely independent
from each other. From this perspective, the connection that I have sought to develop in
this paper can be seen to act as a lynchpin that brings the two literatures together. A
most fruitful avenue for future research is to establish further lynchpins as a way of
incorporating other types of microeconomic insights in the comparative study of
economies.
Future research could also address some of the limitations of the paper’s empirical ana-
lysis. Most importantly, data availability has kept me from analysing a global sample of
countries, analysing a sample of OECD countries instead. The narrow nature of this sam-
ple, covering only countries in relatively advanced stages of economic and institutional ma-
turity, has likely biased my estimates against finding evidence that social trust interacts
with workplace organization to affect the comparative advantage of nations. Nevertheless,
we need follow-up research both to generalize the idea of linking microeconomic insights to
the macroeconomic consequences of (in)formal institutions and to generalize my empirical
evidence to globally representative samples.
8 Compared to the US GSS data that Algan and Cahuc (2010) use, the ESS data are much richer,
allowing me to construct this trust indicator for the largest share of countries in my sample (and,
with an eye to future research, many more countries that are not in my sample).
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Supplementary material
The Appendix for this paper is available online at the OUP website. All data used are pub-
licly available. Data files and the SPSS syntax and Stata Do files that allow the regression re-
sults of this paper to be reproduced from these data sources are also available on the OUP
website.
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